It may be the growing ability of countries outside the traditional great-power hierarchy to determine what that competition actually produces.
India, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Brazil, South Korea and the Gulf states are increasingly demonstrating that geopolitical influence does not require permanent alignment with one major power. Instead, these countries are using their markets, resources, geography, defence capabilities, diplomatic networks and access to competing economic systems to preserve room for manoeuvre.
This is creating a new geography of power.
The strategic advantage of these states is not neutrality in the traditional sense. It is optionality.
A middle power can buy military equipment from one country, energy technology from another, attract investment from a third, negotiate trade agreements with a fourth and participate simultaneously in institutions that compete for influence.
Indonesia's expanding relationship with China illustrates the model. In August 2026, Beijing and Jakarta agreed to deepen cooperation across defence, minerals, energy and technology, including collaboration involving artificial intelligence, green energy, satellites and defence manufacturing. Yet Indonesia continues to maintain important relationships with the United States and other partners while formally preserving its non-aligned foreign-policy tradition.
The same pattern is visible elsewhere.
India continues to deepen strategic and economic relations with the United States while maintaining substantial relationships with Russia and expanding engagement with Europe and the wider Global South. Saudi Arabia is simultaneously a critical US security partner, a major Chinese economic partner and an increasingly autonomous diplomatic actor. Türkiye remains a NATO member while maintaining extensive economic and political relationships with Russia, China, the Gulf and other emerging powers.
The result is not necessarily a world without blocs.
It is a world in which blocs increasingly compete for countries that refuse to belong exclusively to them.
For smaller states; including African economies, the implications are profound. Geopolitical alignment is becoming an economic asset that can influence access to capital, technology, energy, defence systems, markets and diplomatic support.
The strategic question is therefore changing.
Governments and businesses must ask not simply “Who is our ally?”, but “How much strategic optionality do we have?”
The End of Automatic Alignment
For much of the post-Cold War period, globalisation encouraged governments to prioritise economic efficiency over geopolitical diversification.
Trade was increasingly separated from security. Investment decisions were driven primarily by cost. Supply chains were designed around efficiency rather than resilience.
That model is weakening.
Technology restrictions, sanctions, export controls, military competition, energy insecurity and strategic competition are increasingly influencing commercial decisions.
The IMF's 2026 analysis of the changing role of middle powers describes a world in which geopolitics increasingly determines trade, capital flows, technology and energy decisions. It argues that middle powers have an opportunity to shape the emerging order through flexible coalitions rather than waiting for great powers to establish the rules.
This creates a different strategic environment.
A country that depends entirely on one external market, one source of military equipment, one energy supplier or one technology ecosystem becomes vulnerable when geopolitical relationships deteriorate.
Diversification therefore becomes a form of national security.
The objective is not necessarily to avoid alliances.
It is to avoid strategic dependency.
Why Middle Powers Matter Now
Middle powers have always existed, but their importance is increasing because the international system is becoming more fragmented.
The United States and China possess extraordinary economic, military and technological capabilities. Russia remains a major military and energy power. The European Union remains a significant regulatory and commercial force.
But none of these actors can determine global outcomes alone.
Energy markets require producers and consumers.
Technology ecosystems require manufacturing and mineral supply chains.
Trade requires access to emerging markets.
Defence partnerships require regional partners.
Diplomatic initiatives require coalitions.
This creates leverage for countries occupying strategically important positions within these networks.
The Belfer Center identifies a growing group of middle powers; including India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam and others, as increasingly consequential actors in an international system where flexible coalitions can influence outcomes.
Their influence comes from different sources.
India offers scale, technology, a huge consumer market and diplomatic reach.
Indonesia offers critical minerals, maritime geography and access to Southeast Asian markets.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE combine capital, energy resources, logistics infrastructure and strategic geography.
Türkiye combines NATO membership, defence-industrial capability, geographic access between Europe and Asia and influence across several regional theatres.
Brazil combines agricultural strength, natural resources, a large domestic market and diplomatic weight across the Global South.
South Korea combines advanced technology, manufacturing, defence production and supply-chain importance.
These countries do not form a unified bloc.
That is precisely why they matter.
Strategic Autonomy Is Becoming an Asset
The most valuable commodity for many middle powers may be neither oil nor minerals.
It may be strategic autonomy.
Strategic autonomy means maintaining enough political, economic and technological capacity to make independent choices while preserving relationships with multiple external powers.
It is different from isolation.
A strategically autonomous country seeks more relationships, not fewer.
The objective is to ensure that no single relationship becomes indispensable.
India is perhaps the clearest example.
New Delhi has strengthened its strategic partnership with Washington while continuing defence and energy relationships with Russia and expanding economic engagement with Europe, the Gulf and other emerging markets.
Indonesia has similarly sought to preserve strategic flexibility. Its latest agreements with China show how economic and defence cooperation can expand even while Jakarta maintains relationships with Washington and other regional partners.
Türkiye offers another model.
Its strategic-autonomy approach has involved expanding ties beyond traditional Western alliances towards Russia, China and Middle Eastern partners, although researchers note that domestic economic constraints and competing geopolitical priorities can limit how much autonomy Ankara can actually exercise.
The lesson is important:
Strategic autonomy is only as strong as the economic and institutional capacity supporting it.
Diplomatic flexibility without financial resilience, technological capability or credible defence capacity is simply vulnerability disguised as neutrality.
The Rise of Transactional Diplomacy
The emerging geopolitical system is becoming increasingly transactional.
Governments are negotiating relationships issue by issue rather than accepting comprehensive political alignment.
A country may cooperate with Washington on defence, Beijing on infrastructure, Brussels on regulation, Moscow on energy and Gulf investors on capital.
This does not necessarily represent inconsistency.
It can represent strategic portfolio management.
The same principle increasingly applies to economic policy.
Governments are asking:
Who can provide the cheapest energy?
Who can finance infrastructure?
Who can provide advanced technology?
Who can supply defence equipment?
Who offers access to major consumer markets?
Which partnership creates the greatest domestic economic benefit?
Which relationship reduces strategic vulnerability?
Foreign policy is consequently becoming more closely integrated with economic policy.
The distinction between geopolitics and geoeconomics is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.
Defence Is Becoming Diplomatic Leverage
Defence cooperation is one of the most important instruments of middle-power diplomacy.
Countries that develop domestic defence industries gain greater freedom in foreign policy because they become less dependent on external suppliers.
Türkiye's defence-industrial expansion demonstrates this dynamic. Its development of drones, naval systems and other defence technologies has created not only military capability but also an export industry and diplomatic instrument.
South Korea is following a similar trajectory through the expansion of its defence exports.
India is also attempting to increase domestic defence production while maintaining relationships with multiple suppliers.
This creates a reinforcing cycle:
Defence capability → export capacity → diplomatic relationships → strategic autonomy.
Indonesia's agreement with China to deepen defence cooperation, including plans for a joint munitions factory, illustrates how defence partnerships can become intertwined with industrial and technological policy.
For middle powers, defence is therefore no longer simply about military deterrence.
It is also about industrial policy and diplomatic leverage.
Energy and Minerals Create Another Layer of Power
The energy transition is creating new strategic opportunities for middle powers.
Oil and gas remain crucial, but critical minerals, renewable energy systems, batteries, grids and energy technologies are becoming increasingly strategic.
Countries controlling mineral reserves or processing capacity can use those assets to negotiate investment, technology transfer and market access.
Indonesia's nickel sector is an important example.
China has invested heavily in Indonesia's mineral economy, while Jakarta has sought to move further up the value chain through domestic processing and industrial policy.
The relationship illustrates the broader pattern: resource-rich countries increasingly want to exchange market access and raw materials for technology, manufacturing capability and investment rather than simply exporting commodities.
The strategic competition is therefore shifting from:
“Who controls the resource?”
towards:
“Who controls the value chain?”
This distinction will become particularly important for Africa.
Technology Is the New Strategic Terrain
Technology may ultimately become the most important area of middle-power competition.
Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, telecommunications, cloud computing, satellites, biotechnology and advanced manufacturing are increasingly treated as strategic assets.
Countries that become dependent on a single technology ecosystem can face significant geopolitical vulnerability.
Middle powers are therefore seeking technology partnerships across competing systems.
Indonesia's latest engagement with China includes cooperation in AI, green energy and satellites, demonstrating how technology is increasingly integrated into broader diplomatic relationships.
India is also pursuing a diversified technology strategy.
Its economic and investment policy has simultaneously sought to attract capital from the United States, Japan, South Korea, Europe and other partners while managing strategic exposure to China. Recent reforms allowing certain non-controlling investments from neighbouring countries demonstrate how New Delhi is attempting to balance investment openness with national-security considerations.
Technology partnerships therefore increasingly serve two purposes:
economic development and geopolitical insurance.
What This Means for Smaller States
The rise of middle powers creates both opportunities and risks for smaller countries.
The opportunity is greater choice.
Smaller states can potentially negotiate infrastructure, energy, technology, defence and investment agreements with several competing powers rather than depending on one patron.
But choice only creates leverage if governments can negotiate effectively.
A country that enters every negotiation from a position of dependency has limited bargaining power regardless of how many partners it formally maintains.
This means smaller states must build their own strategic assets.
These may include:
critical minerals;
agricultural production;
ports and logistics corridors;
digital infrastructure;
renewable-energy resources;
consumer markets;
specialised manufacturing;
diplomatic geography;
financial institutions;
regional political influence.
The more strategically valuable an economy becomes, the greater its negotiating power.
Africa's Strategic Opportunity
For African economies, the emergence of a more networked geopolitical system could represent an important opportunity to escape traditional dependency patterns.
Africa possesses many of the assets competing powers increasingly need.
The continent has critical minerals, energy resources, agricultural capacity, rapidly expanding consumer markets, strategic maritime corridors and a young workforce.
But resource ownership alone does not guarantee geopolitical leverage.
The strategic question is whether African states can convert resources into industrial and diplomatic capability.
Exporting raw minerals to competing powers creates limited leverage.
Processing those minerals domestically, attracting competing investors, developing local supply chains and negotiating technology transfer creates significantly more.
The same applies to energy.
African states with reliable renewable energy, gas, critical minerals and strategic infrastructure can potentially negotiate simultaneously with European, American, Chinese, Gulf, Indian and other investors.
AfCFTA adds another layer.
A fragmented national market has less bargaining power than a continent-scale market.
The more effectively African economies integrate their markets, infrastructure and supply chains, the greater their ability to negotiate with external powers on more favourable terms.
The Gulf Model: Capital as Geopolitical Infrastructure
The Gulf states offer another important lesson.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar increasingly use sovereign capital, logistics infrastructure, energy assets and investment partnerships as instruments of international influence.
Their influence extends beyond traditional energy diplomacy.
Sovereign wealth funds can finance infrastructure, technology companies, sports, logistics networks and industrial projects across multiple regions.
This gives capital itself a geopolitical dimension.
For African economies, Gulf capital can become one component of a diversified external financing strategy alongside European, American, Chinese, Indian and domestic capital.
The strategic objective should not be choosing one source.
It should be creating competitive tension among multiple sources while ensuring that investments contribute to domestic economic capability.
Are We Entering a Truly Multipolar World?
The answer is not yet clear.
There is strong evidence that the international system is becoming more fragmented and that middle powers possess greater room for manoeuvre.
But this does not necessarily mean the emergence of a stable multipolar order.
Three possible futures are increasingly visible.
Scenario One: Competitive Multipolarity
Multiple major and middle powers retain significant autonomy.
Countries build overlapping partnerships without permanently joining rival blocs.
This would create a highly networked international system in which diplomacy becomes more transactional and flexible.
Scenario Two: Competitive Blocs
The world divides into several increasingly distinct technology, trade and security ecosystems.
Middle powers retain some autonomy but face growing pressure to choose sides.
Strategic flexibility becomes harder as sanctions, export controls and security commitments increase.
Scenario Three: Managed Fragmentation
The most likely outcome may sit between the two.
The world becomes more fragmented, but countries continue to cooperate pragmatically across geopolitical boundaries where economic interests require it.
Competition and cooperation coexist.
China and Indonesia's latest agreements are an example of this possibility: security competition in the Indo-Pacific exists alongside expanding economic and technological cooperation.
The emerging system may therefore be less about a new hierarchy and more about overlapping networks.
What Decision-Makers Should Do Next
Governments: Build Optionality
Governments should treat strategic diversification as a national capability.
That means avoiding excessive dependence on a single country for:
energy;
defence;
technology;
infrastructure finance;
trade;
critical imports;
export markets.
Diversification creates negotiating power.
But governments should also recognise that strategic autonomy requires domestic capability. Foreign-policy flexibility cannot survive indefinitely without strong institutions, credible finances and productive economies.
Businesses: Treat Geopolitics as a Core Business Variable
Companies can no longer treat geopolitical risk as an occasional external shock.
Boards should map exposure across:
suppliers;
customers;
currencies;
logistics corridors;
technology platforms;
energy sources;
sanctions regimes;
regulatory jurisdictions;
critical minerals.
Companies should also develop alternative suppliers and markets before a crisis forces them to do so.
The strategic objective is not to eliminate geopolitical exposure.
It is to prevent any single geopolitical relationship from becoming an existential business dependency.
Investors: Follow Strategic Networks
Investors should increasingly examine geopolitical connectivity alongside conventional financial indicators.
The most attractive opportunities may emerge where countries are investing to create strategic autonomy.
This includes:
defence manufacturing;
energy infrastructure;
ports and logistics;
critical-mineral processing;
semiconductor and technology ecosystems;
digital infrastructure;
industrial manufacturing;
food security;
cross-border financial infrastructure.
Investment flows increasingly reveal geopolitical priorities.
Understanding those priorities can provide an important early signal of where capital will move next.
Executive Outlook
The geography of global power is changing.
The defining actors of the next phase of international competition will not be limited to Washington, Beijing, Moscow or Brussels.
Increasingly, decisions made in New Delhi, Ankara, Riyadh, Jakarta, Brasília, Seoul and the Gulf capitals will determine how competing power centres interact.
This does not mean middle powers have replaced great powers.
They have not.
Their importance comes from something different: they can influence the connections between great powers.
They control markets that major economies need.
They possess resources that global industries require.
They can provide diplomatic support that competing powers seek.
They can join one security network while maintaining economic relationships with another.
And, increasingly, they can convert defence, technology, energy and capital into diplomatic leverage.
For African governments, this creates a strategic opening.
The continent does not need to choose between competing powers simply because those powers are competing with one another.
It can negotiate.
But successful negotiation requires assets, scale and strategic discipline.
The countries that extract the greatest value from the new geopolitical environment will be those that turn their geography, resources, markets and institutions into bargaining power.
For businesses, the implication is equally significant.
Geopolitical alignment is becoming a commercial variable.
The ability to operate across multiple markets, diversify suppliers, understand competing regulatory regimes and build resilient partnerships will increasingly determine corporate competitiveness.
The world is therefore not simply moving from unipolarity to multipolarity.
It is moving towards something more complicated:
a competitive network of powers in which influence depends increasingly on who can connect—and negotiate between—the major centres of power.
The strategic winners will be those with the greatest number of credible options.
And in a fragmented world, optionality itself is becoming power.
· International Monetary Fund — “The Middle Power Moment”
· Reuters — China and Indonesia deepen military, minerals, energy and technology cooperation
· Reuters — India receives investment proposals under revised neighbouring-country policy
· Lowy Institute — “Middle powers are reshaping the Indo-Pacific, too”
· Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — “The Middle Power Moment”
· Belfer Center — Middle Powers Research and Analysis
· International Politics — “Strategic autonomy in Turkish foreign policy in an age of multipolarity”
· Brookings Institution — “Turkey’s search for a Middle East order”
· International Politics — “Regional powers and the Indo-Pacific: comparing India and Indonesia”
Republished from the existing Aldrenor collection. Aldrenor editorial archive.
